The proliferation of increasingly strict voter identification laws around the country has raised concerns about voter suppression. Although there are many reasons to suspect that these laws could harm groups like racial minorities and the poor, existing studies have generally failed to demonstrate a link between voter ID laws and voter turnout among these groups. We question these null effects. We argue that because most of the studies occurred before states enacted strict identification requirements, they uncover few effects. By using validated voting data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study for several recent elections, we are able to offer a more definitive test. The analysis shows that strict identification laws have a differentially negative impact on the turnout of Hispanics, Blacks, Asian Americans, and multi-racial Americans in primaries and general elections. We also find that voter ID laws skew democracy toward those on the political right.
because fraud is a real and potentially widespread phenomenon that could alter electoral outcomes and erode faith in democracy. Advocates also argue that voter identification laws do not reduce the participation of citizens because they do not prevent legitimate voters from entering the voting booth. For the Americans who have identification, the laws raise no new barriers. For the tiny subset of Americans who do not, the requirement represents a small hurdle that is easily overcome.
Moreover, the American public strongly favors these laws (Coren 2014) . From this perspective, the passage of these laws ensures that only eligible American participate and restores trust in the democratic process.
Who is right? Are these laws simply minor alterations that serve only to reduce fraud or are they major barriers that substantially alter who votes and who wins in the American political arena?
The key to answering this question and to determining the benefits or drawbacks of voter identification is to provide hard empirical evidence of the actual consequences of voter identification laws.
Evaluating Voter ID Laws
Unfortunately, despite all of the partisan and political debate, we have relatively little empirical data on the consequences of these laws. Several studies have identified areas of concern that could ultimately lead to large, negative consequences for American elections. Although the findings have been disputed, several studies appear to have uncovered a relatively large number of Americans without proper identification (GAO 2014 , Barreto and Sanchez 2014 , Pastor et al 2010 .
Others have shown that a lack of identification is particularly acute among the minority population, the poor, and the young Sanchez 2014, Ansolabehere 2014 A different set of researchers has attempted to assess whether the existing laws are applied evenly and have found that poll workers disproportionately ask minorities for identification (White et al 2015 , Rogowski and Cohen 2014 , Atkeson et al 2014 , Cobb et al 2012 , Ansolabehere 2009 ).
There is even some evidence that in a small set of cases provisional ballots that should have been counted have ultimately not been included in vote tallies (Pitts 2013) . Finally, there is at least tangential evidence of the political motivations behind the passage of these laws. These laws are generally passed by Republicans and tend to emerge in states with larger minority populations and greater partisan competition (Bentele and O'Brien 2013, Hicks et al 2014 ) . All of this evidence suggests that the consequences of voter identification could be severe.
There are, in short, many reasons to suspect problems with these laws. Yet none of these studies assesses the actual consequences of these laws. The core question is not who could be affected but is instead who is affected. At the end of the day, do voter ID laws reduce participation and skew the electorate in favor of one set of interests and against another set of interests?
On this core question, the published results seem to point to limited effects. The main published studies find little to no effect on overall turnout (Ansolabehere 2009 , Mycoff et al 2009 . 4 More importantly, on the question of who votes and who does not, the research is almost 4 There are, however, a series of non-refereed manuscripts that reach more negative conclusions about voter ID laws. This includes studies by the General Accounting Office (2014), Dropp (2013), Vercellotti and Anderson (2006) , and Alvarez et al (2008) . Given that the methodology and research design employed in these studies has not been vetted, it is often difficult to reach firm conclusions about the impact of voter ID laws. Dropp (2013) , for example, examines an impressive array of individual voting records but has no controls for context -a critical omission given that factors like competition, spending, and mobilization both matter a lot for turnout and vary widely unequivocal. The few published studies that have looked for differential effects by race have found none (Hood and Bullock 2012 , Alvarez et al 2008 , Mycoff et al 2009 , Alvarez et al 2010 , Milyo 2007 ). In the end few scholars have been able to effectively counter the literature's core conclusion that "voter ID does not appear to present a significant barrier to voting" (Ansolabehere 2009: 129) .
Limitations of the Existing Research
Can it be that voter identification laws actually have minimal effects on American democracy? We believe that there are three fundamental problems with the tests to date. The first problem is that scholars have almost exclusively analyzed elections that occurred before the strictest voter identification laws were put in the place. States that have non-strict laws still allow people to vote if they do not have ID, so these laws might have little impact. If the major effects of voter ID laws only occur when states require voters to present identification before voting, then existing studies generally are not actually assessing the impact of these laws. 5 The rapid and very recent proliferation of these laws means that any research that examines the vote in anything but the last election cycle or two will miss most of the effects of these laws. As a result, most existing studies are likely to understate the significance of these laws. Arguably then, we do not yet know if strict forms of voter identification matter.
across states and electoral years. Likewise, the GAO study (2014) only analyzes the effect of ID laws in two states and fails to include controls for electoral environment. Alvarez et al (2008) and Vercellotti and Anderson (2006) both examine turnout before strict photo ID laws were enforced.
5 All but one of the existing published studies assessing differential turnout look at data from 2006 or earlier, when there were no strict photo ID states. Hood and Bullock (2012) include 2008 data but only look at one election in one state with strict voter ID laws in place.
Another core problem with much of the existing analysis is that it focuses on self-reported rather than validated turnout. Self-reported turnout is much higher than actual turnout Hersh 2012, Silver et al 1986) . More critically, those who over-report turnout differ by race and class from those who do not over-report turnout. Racial minorities, in particular, are particularly prone to over-report their participation in elections (Shaw et al 2000, Abramson and Clagget 1991) . All of this makes it extremely difficult to assess the racial and class effects of voter ID laws using self-reported turnout.
Finally, despite all of the discussion about how these laws benefit Republicans and hurt Democrats, there has been little empirical analysis of the political consequences of strict voter ID laws. Several studies have assessed the political and partisan motivations for adopting these laws but more work needs to be done on how these laws ultimately affect the mix of partisan and ideological voters (Hicks et al 2014, Bentele and O'Brien 2013 With this new data we believe that we have been able to rectify the core problems of existing studies and can thus offer a more definitive test of voter identification laws. In doing so, we find that strict voter identification laws substantially alter the makeup of who votes and ultimately skew democracy in favor of whites and those on the political right. These laws significantly impact the representativeness of the vote and the fairness of democracy.
A Theory and Potential Mechanisms
Before proceeding, it is important to think through exactly why and how voter identification laws might differentially impact voter turnout. There may be two distinct potential mechanisms which might exacerbate racial, class, age, and/or partisan gaps in turnout. 8 The first is direct.
8 A third potential mechanism is that campaigns, candidates, and parties may behave differently after voter ID laws are passed. If Democratic leaders believe that the passage of voter identification laws signals increased Republican dominance in these states, the Democratic Party might reduce its campaign expenditures and mobilization efforts. In alternate tests we do find that respondents report significantly less mobilization by campaigns after strict ID laws are passed but minorities, the poor, and Democrats do not report greater decreases in contact than whites, the well-off, or Republicans.
Moreover, our results below hold after controlling for both campaign contact and campaign spending. All of this suggests demobilization -or mobilization -by the Democratic Party and its candidates is not a major part of the voter ID law story.
Individual citizens who do not have the required identification will learn about the identification requirements and will decide not to vote or will try to vote and will be turned away at the polls.
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Eligible voters who lack valid identification could, of course, choose to acquire the necessary identification but past research clearly demonstrates that any additional hurdle to voting, however small or large, can have a substantial impact on the likelihood of voting -especially among lowpropensity voters (Leighley and Nagler 2014, Verba et al 1995) . The fact that other small state level institutional barriers like registration deadlines have been shown to impact turnout further implies that voter ID could matter (Burden et al 2013, Larocca and Kleminski 2011) . Since a lack of identification is particularly pronounced among racial minorities, the socioeconomically 9 The best, most recent data suggest that about half of all voters without proper ID are aware of that fact. Barreto and Sanchez (2014) disadvantaged, younger voters, and those on the political left, the law should disproportionately reduce the turnout of these groups. This direct mechanism is the one that critics typically focus on.
But there is a second, more diffuse mechanism that could also differentially impact turnout.
Even if they have the proper identification, some citizens might feel targeted or threatened by these laws and might therefore choose not to participate. 10 Where and when these laws are passed, members of certain groups might feel unwelcome at the polls and even worried about retaliation for going to the polls. This is especially true for racial minorities who have been the subject of election related violence at different points in American history but could also impact those on the political left and potentially even younger, socioeconomically disadvantaged voters (Kousser 1999 , Parker 1990 ).
Unfortunately, while we suspect that each of these mechanisms is likely to contribute to differential declines in turnout, we cannot directly test each mechanism or distinguish between them with our data. The CCES, our main survey, does not include ask respondents if they have identification and includes no questions about feelings of threat or alienation. 11 We can test to see if voter ID laws differentially lower turnout but we cannot show how they do so.
Data
To assess the impact of voter identification laws on turnout, we utilize data from the 2006- and 5) a photo ID required. We follow this convention for alternate tests. But for our main analysis, we single out strict identification laws -those that prevent the voter from casting a regular ballot if they cannot present appropriate identification -because we believe these stricter laws have the greatest potential to dramatically impact turnout. These stricter laws make it easy for election administrators to prevent many voters from casting a regular ballot. Given estimates of the large number of Americans that do not have ready access to proper identification, the possibility of widespread effects is real. Moreover, it is these stricter laws that have garnered the lion's share of attention from voting rights activists and the media. That attention alone could be instrumental in dissuading large shares of the public from going to the polls. We begin by singling out strict identification laws -those that require an ID (coded as a 1 for all states that have these laws in place). 12 We then assess if there is a significant difference between strict ID laws that require a photo ID and those that allow some forms of non-photo identification.
The main goal in the analysis is to assess the differential effects of voter identification laws on the participation of distinct groups. In particular, we examine if these laws have a more pronounced effect on racial and ethnic minorities and those on the political left.
We focus on turnout in both general and primary elections. The main dependent variablesgeneral and primary votes -are coded as 1 for a validated vote in that contest and 0 otherwise.
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In terms of race and ethnicity, we single out respondents who self-identified as white, Black, Latino, Asian American, or indicated that they were multi-racial. To assess the political consequences of ID laws, respondents are asked their partisanship and liberal-conservative ideology. We employ a standard 7 point party identification scale and a standard 5 point ideology scale. In each case, the key test is whether each of these individual characteristics interacts with voter identification laws and leads to especially large declines in turnout.
We also control for individual demographic characteristics that help to drive voter participation in previous research (Verba et al 1995) . These include age (measured in years), education level (a 6 point scale), family income (a 16 point scale), nativity (foreign born, first generation American, or other), gender, marital status (married or not), having children, being a 12 Given the claim that the initial passage of these laws can temporarily fuel anger and voter mobilization, we add a dummy variable to test for this temporary mobilization (Valentino et al 2015; Citrin et al 2014) . 13 Respondents who could not be matched to voter files are dropped from the analysis.
union member, owning a home, being unemployed, and religion (Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Atheist, or other).
14 To isolate the effects of voter identification laws, we also have to incorporate other statelevel electoral laws that encourage or discourage participation. Research assessing the permissiveness of a state's election laws typically assess if the state 1) allows early voting (Burden et al 2013, Giammo and Box 2010) , 2) has all-mail elections (Karp and Banducci 2000) , and 3) allows no excuse absentee voting (Larocca and Klemanski 2011) . Generally, the most important institutional factor driving state turnout is, however, the limit on the number of days before the election that residents can register to vote (coded in days) (Burden et al 2013, Larocca and Klemanski 2011) . All are included here.
Finally, to help identify the independent effect of ID laws, our analysis has to include the Given that our main dependent variables are coded 1 for voters and 0 for non-voters we employ logistic regressions. 15 To incorporate the non-independence of respondents within each state, we cluster errors by state.
14 Since we expect the effects to be most pronounced for registered voters, we drop non-registered respondents from our main analysis. The pattern of effects is similar either way. 15 We also re-ran our analysis using hierarchical linear models. The basic pattern of results did not change appreciably across multiple HLM specifications.
Analysis
We begin by repeating the core analysis of most existing studies. Specifically, we evaluate whether identification laws lower overall turnout. The regressions assess whether individual turnout is lower in states with strict ID laws than in all other states controlling for a host of different factors that could impact turnout. The first column in Table 1 we measure voter identification laws or which other factors we include in our regression model.
That conclusion is hardly surprising given that it fits with the bulk of existing studies.
ID Laws and Minority Turnout
The critical question is not whether the average American is affected by voter identification laws. Rather, it is whether these laws have a negative impact on minorities and other disadvantaged groups. To begin to assess this possibility, we simply compare turnout by race in strict voter ID states with turnout by race in non-strict ID states without controlling for any other factors. The pattern in both primary and general election is clear. There are substantial drops in minority turnout in strict voter ID states and no real changes in white turnout. Hispanic turnout is 7.1 points lower in strict voter ID states than it is in other states in general elections and 5.3 points lower in primary elections. For Blacks, the gap is negligible in general elections but a full 4.6 points in primaries.
For Asian Americans the difference is 5.4 points and 6.2 points. And for multi-racial Americans turnout is 5.3 points lower in strict voter ID states in general elections and 6.7 points lower in primary contests. White turnout is relatively flat and, if anything, increases slightly in strict identification states. The increase for white turnout in strict ID states is 0.2 points in general elections and 0.4 points in primary elections.
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The end result is, in most cases, a substantial increase in the gap between white and nonturnout in strict voter ID states. Latinos, for example, generally vote less frequently than whites but in strict voter ID states the gap between Hispanics and whites increases by a full 7.3 points in general elections and a similarly large 5.7 points in primary contests. The Black-white, Asian
American-white and multi-racial American-white gaps grow almost as much. In strict voter ID states minorities are lagging further and further behind whites.
Of course, the pattern in Figure 1 American, and multi-racial American turnout is differentially and negatively impacted by the presence of these laws, we add interactions between strict ID laws and each racial group.
The results, which are presented in the first two columns of In all cases, the significant effects are politically meaningful. The models reveal substantial drops in turnout for minorities under strict voter ID laws. In the general elections, the model predicts that Latinos are 10 percent less likely to turn out in states with strict ID laws than in states without strict ID regulations, all else equal. These effects are almost as large in primary elections.
Here, a strict ID law could be expected to depress Latino turnout by 9.3 points, Black turnout by 8.6
points, and Asian American turnout by 12.5 points. 17 Given the already low turnout of most of these groups across the country, these declines are all the more noteworthy.
Importantly, as illustrated by Figure 2 , these laws serve not only to diminish minority participation, they also increase the gap in the participation rate between whites and non-whites. For
Latinos in the general election, the predicted gap more than doubles from 4.9 points in states without strict ID laws to 13.5 points in states with strict photo ID laws. The predicted Latino-white gap more than triples from 3.4 points to 13.2 in primaries. Likewise, for African Americans the predicted gap in general contests increases from 2.9 points to 5.1 points and in primaries more than quintuples from 2.5 points to 11.6 points. For Asian Americans the predicted gap grows from 6.5 percent to 11.5 points in general elections and from 5.8 points to 18.8 points. In the case of multiracial Americans, strict ID laws may be creating a racial disadvantage where there typically was none. Multi-racial Americans voted at almost the exact same predicted rate as whites (a 0.1 point gap) in primaries in non-strict ID states but were 7.1 percent less likely than whites to participate in primaries in strict ID states, all else equal.
Note: Race specific effect for white vs Asian and white vs black in general elections and multi-racial effect in primaries are not significant at p<.05.
17 For multi-racial race Americans the drop is 6.6 points but it is not quite statistically significant. This is exactly what we find. Re-running the analysis with Democrats only, we still find that Latino, Asian American, and multi-racial American turnout is significantly more likely to be depressed by voter ID laws than white turnout (analysis in Table 1 of the Online Appendix).
Beyond Race
Racial minorities are not the only groups that could be impacted by voter identification laws.
One might expect these laws to have pronounced effects on other disadvantaged groups as well.
Indeed, a good portion of the debate around these laws has focused on younger and lower class Americans. To assess the impact on these groups, we looked at a range of interactions between class, age, and voter identification laws.
the racial demographics of the state (including percent Black, Latino, Asian American, undocumented, and white).
In terms of age, we found little of note. There were, however, some small indications that lower class Americans are especially impacted by strict ID laws. But the results for class are not nearly as clear or robust as they are for race. Of all of the different interactions between different measures of class and different measures of voter identification laws that we examined, only one or two were significant. In particular, we found that strict photo ID laws were associated with a significant reduction in the electoral participation of Americans at the very bottom of the socioeconomic spectrum -those without a high school degree -in general elections. But these significant results often faded when we altered the model in different ways and were not evident at all in primary elections. We suspect that the least advantaged Americans may be hurt by these laws but we are far from certain that this is the case.
There are two reasons why one might expect race effects to be more pronounced than class effects. First, the best available evidence suggests that a lack of identification is particularly pronounced among racial and ethnic minorities even after controlling for class. Barreto and Sanchez (2014) find that even among those with family incomes less than $20,000, there are huge disparities in access to identification. In their Texas sample, only 16 percent of poor white citizens lacked proper identification while fully 41 percent of poor Blacks and 40 percent of poor Hispanics did not have identification. If a lack of identification is the primary barrier, then it is a barrier that most dramatically impacts racial and ethnic minorities.
As well, if fear of retaliation or a sense of marginalization is what drives individuals away from the polls, then that fear and marginalization is likely to be especially acute for racial and ethnic minorities. Poor and younger Americans may feel that they have less of a say than others but they have not been subject to the same discrimination, electoral intimidation, and violence that has targeted African Americans, Latinos, and other minorities at different points in American history (Kousser 1999 , Parker 1990 , Almaguer 1994 . Moreover, when strict voter ID laws are passed, the discussion in the media and among critics tends, we think, to be much more focused on how these laws target minorities than on how they target the poor or the young. Racial and ethnic minorities have more reason to fear intimidation and more reason to feel targeted.
The Political Consequences of Voter Identification
Opponents of these strict voter ID laws also regularly claim that one of the main motivations behind the laws is to limit the participation of democratic leaning groups in order to benefit the Republican Party. Yet scholars have not directly tested this assertion.
In Table 3 These effects turn out to be substantial. Democratic turnout drops by an estimated 8.8
percentage points in general elections when strict photo identification laws are in place. By comparison, the predicted drop for Republicans is only 3.6 points. The skew for political ideology is even more severe. For strong liberals the estimated drop in turnout in strict photo identification states is an alarming 7.9 percentage points. By contrast, strong conservatives actually vote at a slightly higher rate -4.8 points -in strict ID states, all else equal.
All of this has major political consequences. As Figure 3 illustrates the rate at which Republicans and conservatives outvote Democrats and liberals is much higher when strict photo laws are in place. All else equal, Republicans and conservatives tend to vote at slightly higher rates than Democrats and liberals but that gap grows considerably in strict ID states. In particular, in primary elections, the model predicts that the turnout gap between Republicans and Democrats more than doubles from 4.3 points to 9.8 points when strict ID laws are instituted. Likewise the predicted gap between conservatives and liberals more than doubles from 7.7 to 20.4 points. These results suggest that by instituting strict photo ID laws, states can minimize the influence of voters on the left and can substantially alter the political leaning of the electorate.
However, when we shift the focus to general elections, there is much less evidence of a partisan or ideological impact. Returning to models 1 and 2 in Table 3 , we see that neither of the interactions is significant. This suggests that at least during general elections, Democrats and liberals are not more impacted than Republicans or conservatives by the presence of strict voter ID laws. But that conclusion may be premature for two reasons. First, in alternate analysis which we discuss below there are signs that when we single out the strictest voter identification laws -strict photo ID requirements -those on the left are most negatively affected -even in general elections. Second, the two general elections included in our dataset -2008 and 2012 -are unique in that Barack Obama was on the ballot in both contests. We know that Barack Obama's candidacy mobilized minority turnout -especially black turnout -to historic levels. That mobilization may have limited the impact of strict voter identification laws in those two contests. [TABLE 3 HERE] We can examine the political effects of voter identification laws in a slightly different way.
If we are concerned about the well-being of racial and ethnic minority voters, we might want to look specifically at how these laws affect the mix of views on race and immigration that are present at the polls. In particular, we might want to know if strict voter identification laws are associated with an increase in the share of voters with more racially resentful views or an increase in the share of voters with more anti-immigrant views.
To assess those links in alternate tests we added interactions between racial resentment and immigration attitudes and strict voter identification laws to the basic regression model in Table 2 .
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While the CCES only asked about race and immigration in two years, we nevertheless find significant interactions for both sets of views. Americans with racially resentful attitudes and those with more negative views of immigrants were substantially more likely to turnout in primaries in states with strict voter identification laws than in other states, all else equal. The result is that the 19 Racial resentment was a scale measured with two questions that are the standard for assessing racial resentment -"Blacks should work their way up without any favors" and" "Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class" (Kinder and Sanders 1994). Immigration views combined questions on whether or not the US government should "allow the police to question anyone they think may be in the country illegally," "increase the number of border patrols", and "grant legal status to illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes." Both scales were alpha factor scores.
share of voters with anti-immigrant and anti-minority views grows substantially when strict voter identification laws are in place (see Table 2 of the Online Appendix).
Which Identification Laws Matter
Up to this point, we have been focusing on strict identification laws -those laws that require identification in order for their vote to count. But there are other ways of distinguishing between different types of voter identification laws. One possibility is to single out strict voter identification laws that require photo identification. These strict photo identification laws garner a lot of attention and have received some of the greatest criticism. When we test to see if these strict photo identification laws have more pronounced effects than strict non-photo identification laws, we find that for the most part the effects are statistically indistinguishable. Both negatively impact minority turnout at roughly the same rate. The one exception as noted above is that strict photo identification laws may have more of an effect than strict non-photo identification laws on the relative turnout of those on the political left and those on the political right in general elections. In alternate models, when we substitute in interactions with strict photo identification laws in Table 3 , we find a significant relationship between ideology and strict photo identification (see online appendix).
Liberals appear to be especially disadvantaged in strict photo ID laws in general election contests.
It is also possible that state laws that request but do not require identification also matter.
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However, we could find no effects for state laws that merely requested that voters provide identification. Turnout was not noticeably higher or lower in states that requested identification (whether it was a photo identification or not) and we find no significant interactions between race or any other demographic variable and the presence of a law that requested voter identification. Put simply, there was no discernable difference between states that have no voter identification laws and those that request some form of identification (photo or otherwise). While we are not certain why these kinds of laws had little impact, we surmise it could be one of two things. First, it could be that residents know that they can ultimately vote without an ID and thus are not deterred. Second, it could be that minorities and others do not feel as threatened by these more lenient laws. open seat in the gubernatorial election, and finally whether or not each respondent indicated they 21 The fact that there was no discernible difference between states that had no voter laws and those that merely requested IDs helps explain why alternate tests that assessed the strength of voter ID laws were less conclusive. When we interacted race with a five point scale of voter ID laws, the interactive effects tended to be smaller in magnitude and were less consistently significant across different specifications of the model. 22 Given the South's history of racially discriminatory voter disenfranchisement, we repeated all of the analysis separately on Southern and non-Southern states. Interesting, the effects of voter ID laws in the South were generally similar to their effects in the non-South. There were, however, some signs that the political consequences of voter ID laws were more pronounced in the South (voter ID laws skewed turnout toward the political right in both general elections and primaries in the South).
had been contacted or mobilized by one of the campaigns. Likewise, to ensure we had not missed individual characteristics that might impact turnout, in alternate tests, we augmented the basic regression model with measures for years living in the current residence, church attendance, religiosity, being born again, and several different variants of education and income. None of these variables altered the basic conclusions of our analysis.
Next we performed a placebo check. We looked to see if voter ID laws had any effect on different forms of political participation that do not require identification. Specifically, we assessed the impact of strict and non-strict photo ID on protesting, attending a meeting, signing a petition, and donating. We could find no link between state voter ID laws and these non-voting forms of participation.
In another critical test, we shifted to an analysis that incorporated both state and year fixed effects. By adding dummy variables for every state and every year, we essentially control away all of the features that are unique to each state and each election year. If a state was more Republican or more anti-minority in ways that we did not measure or in ways that are not measurable at all, that difference was soaked up with the fixed effects. In the end, the fixed effects model should tell us how turnout differs from the norm in each individual state when voter ID laws are enacted and thus should get us closer to an estimate of the change due specifically to implementation of voter identification laws. This "difference-in-differences" design is among the most rigorous ways to examine panel data.
The fixed effects analysis which is displayed in the online appendix tells essentially the story as our other analysis. Racial and ethnic minorities and liberals and Democrats are especially hurt by strict voter identification laws.
Finally, we attempted to drill down into the data even further by looking at changes in turnout in individual states when they first enact new voter ID laws. Following GAO 2014, Keele (Alvarez et al 2008) .
Despite all of these tests, we readily admit that our analysis cannot definitively show a causal connection between voter ID laws and turnout (Erikson and Minnite 2009, Keele and Minozzi 2013) . States that pass voter ID laws are likely to be different from states that don't pass these laws on a number of different dimensions that we cannot yet identify. Thus our findings are suggestive rather than conclusive.
24 Thus, although the pattern was often the same, the differences were less likely to be significant. Moreover, the fate of these laws is far from certain. Opponents of these laws have repeatedly challenged these laws in the courts and are likely to continue to do so in the future. As such, there is every chance that the courts will determine whether these laws endure or not. The final decision may well rest with the Supreme Court which has yet to come down firmly on either side of the debate.
All of this means that there is a desperate need for hard, empirical evidence. Given upcoming legal challenges and the rapidly changing nature of the laws across the states, there is a chance that clear, objective, and empirical answers to the core voter identification debates could actually sway outcomes.
For the courts and for American democracy the core question should be -are these laws fair? Do they limit the access and participation of the nation's most disadvantaged? Are these laws racially discriminatory? The findings presented here strongly suggest that these laws do, in fact, have real consequences for the makeup of the voting population. Where they are enacted, racial and ethnic minorities are less apt to vote. The voices of Latinos and to a slightly lesser extent those of Blacks, Asian Americans, and multi-racial Americans all become more muted and the relatively influence of white America grows. An already significant racial skew in American democracy becomes all the more pronounced.
All of this also has clear partisan and political consequences. Strict voter ID laws appear to diminish the participation of Democrats and those on the left, while doing little to deter the vote of Republicans and those on the right. They produce a clear partisan distortion.
The effects of voter ID laws are concerning in isolation. But they are perhaps even more alarming when viewed across the longer arc of American history. The effects of voter ID laws that we see here are eerily similar to the impact of measures like poll taxes, literacy tests, residency requirements, and at-large elections which were used by the white majority decades and centuries ago to help deny Blacks many basic rights (Keyssar 2009 , Kousser 1999 , Parker 1990 , Filer, Kenny and Morton 1991 . The nature of older barriers and current voter ID laws today remain eerily similar: they were both instituted by advocates who claimed they would help to ensure the integrity and legitimacy of democracy. Both sets of measures -new and old -also serve to distort democracy and reduce the influence of racial minorities. The racially biased measures of old have since been condemned and revoked but they were allowed to stand for long periods of American electoral history. What will happen with voter ID today?
For others, what makes voter ID laws more disturbing is that they are just one of the many different ways in which the electoral system is being altered today. Shortened early voting periods, repeal of same-day voter registration, reduced polling hours, a decrease in poll locations, and At the same time it is important to recognize that this article is far from the last word on voter identification. These laws are relatively new and have had only a brief period of time to take effect. As a result, the impact of these laws may change over time. In addition, we remain uncertain as to exactly how these laws work to skew turnout. We have shown that voter ID laws suppress minority turnout but not how they do so. It could be that more minorities don't have the requisite ID, that the costs of obtaining an ID are too high for minorities to bear, that passing these laws sends a signal to minorities that they are not wanted at the ballot box, or some combination of the above. We simply don't know. And we need to know. For example, does the recent reduction in early voting in the states mean that the gap between white turnout and minority turnout is expanding even more? Are shorter polling hours, as some suspect, further skewing American democracy? The more we answer these kinds of questions, the more we will be able to offer accurate assessments of the fairness of American democracy and the more we will be able to recommend a clear path forward.
